Armitage 1.0

This is a rather old version dated back to November 2007 but perhaps someone will find this info useful.

On the server side it's driven by PHP with MySQL as the backend. File structure is similar to other packs. One noticable difference in the way statistics are tracked, as all packs track visitors and these numbers are used in marketing of packs.

Armitage has an additional section to calculate how many visitors were actually compromised. Typically this is done by recording how many people request a download of a loader (trojan binary) which means the exploit worked. However, this does not account for the fact that loader may have been blocked on the client due to various defenses. Any pack's job is to deliver an exploit and load some binary and many packs are satisfied with just recording such requests. In Armitage's case it is accomplished by recording an additional request which must be made by this loader. This statistic will represent how many devices have been compromised and have gotten the loader to fully execute and check-in. It is unclear why this decision was made for a generic pack since loaders will now have to be specifically written to perform this check-in function. Such loader was not distributed with the pack itself so it is possible that this was not written for general public.

Contains password variables for admin and guest.

Defines variables needed to establish database connection (host, schema, user, and password).

Establishes a database connection and creates the necessary tables. Once complete shows a link to admin page and required credentials.

Defines two valid accounts admin and guest. Shows traffic and loads statistics as well as has the ability to upload a new trojan and change passwords.

Defines various functions which identify the visitor based on UAS.

Creates the URL for loader "exe.php" and if GET contains "?ex=" integer then this value will be passed to "exe.php?ex=".

Checks visitor's IP address for previous visits and aborts if one is found. String "^_~" is returned upon abort.

Identifies the browser, the following list is used: Opera, Konqueror, Lynx, Links, Internet Explorer, Netscape, Firefox, Mozilla, Other.

Identifies the OS with the following list: Windows (95, NT 4, 98, ME, 2000, XP, 2003, Vista), Linux, Mac OS, Other.

Identifes the Country based on GeoIP library from visitor's IP address. Geoip files are borrowed from Icepack.

Updates statistics for HTTP Referrer, domain only. Sanitizes the referrer domain to avoid SQL injection.

Updates statistics for Browser, OS, and Country. Inserts visitor's IP address and time of visit.

Exploit is served for Internet Explorer from "e.php", for Opera from "opera.php", and Firefox from "ff.php".

Second stage of the exploit sequence, which serves the binary file. By default it is "./load/file.exe", but if GET "?ex=" integer was set then file with that value is delivered (eg: "./load/file20.exe"). Identifies the visitor (Browser, OS, Country) and updates "loads" statistics table.

Identifies the Country based on Geoip of the connection and updates the "ots" (otstuk) statistics table. This is the place where loader's check-in stats are kept.

Serves the MDAC exploit slightly obfuscated. CVE-2006-0003 ; MS06-014 ; MDAC (BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36). If this fails then will load "bof.php".

Contains the shellcode for buffer overflow exploits.

Serves the WFI exploit. CVE-2006-3730 ; MS06-057 ; "WebViewFolderIcon.WebViewFolderIcon.1.setSlice()".

At the end display the 404 Not Found page which is fake since real HTTP Status code is still 200 OK.

Serves exploits for Firefox browsers

Serves exploits for Opera browsers


PE offsets within malware

Building on work mentioned in the previous post couple of more interesting facts were identified. Realizing that implementing the Snort's SO rule may not be feasible in some infrastructures, depending on the design and configuration of the sensors, it would be beneficial to identify most common offsets used by malware and how they compare to legitimate executables.

After reviewing offsets found in an installation of Windows XP SP2 system utilizing 8000 samples, both executable and DLL files, and then comparing with offsets found in malware collected over the last year and a half (450 samples) there were several unique offset identified which were solely used by malware.

As a result of this several regular Snort signatures can be written which will alert on download of binaries which should raise suspicion.

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"LOCAL Suspicious Executable (PE under 128)"; flow:established,from_server; content:"MZ"; rawbytes; byte_test:4,<,128,58,relative,little; content:"PE|00 00|"; rawbytes; within:130; sid:62; rev:1;)

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"LOCAL Suspicious Executable (PE offset 12)"; flow:established,from_server; content:"MZ"; rawbytes; byte_test:4,=,12,58,relative,little; content:"PE|00 00|"; rawbytes; within:14; sid:53; rev:1;)

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"LOCAL Suspicious Executable (PE offset 16)"; flow:established,from_server; content:"MZ"; rawbytes; byte_test:4,=,16,58,relative,little; content:"PE|00 00|"; rawbytes; within:18; sid:54; rev:1;)

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"LOCAL Suspicious Executable (PE offset 64)"; flow:established,from_server; content:"MZ"; rawbytes; byte_test:4,=,64,58,relative,little; content:"PE|00 00|"; rawbytes; within:66; sid:55; rev:1;)

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"LOCAL Suspicious Executable (PE offset 96)"; flow:established,from_server; content:"MZ"; rawbytes; byte_test:4,=,96,58,relative,little; content:"PE|00 00|"; rawbytes; within:98; sid:56; rev:1;)

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"LOCAL Suspicious Executable (PE offset 124)"; flow:established,from_server; content:"MZ"; rawbytes; byte_test:4,=,124,58,relative,little; content:"PE|00 00|"; rawbytes; within:128; sid:57; rev:1;)

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"LOCAL Suspicious Executable (PE offset 144)"; flow:established,from_server; content:"MZ"; rawbytes; byte_test:4,=,144,58,relative,little; content:"PE|00 00|"; rawbytes; within:146; sid:58; rev:1;)

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"LOCAL Suspicious Executable (PE offset 152)"; flow:established,from_server; content:"MZ"; rawbytes; byte_test:4,=,152,58,relative,little; content:"PE|00 00|"; rawbytes; within:154; sid:59; rev:1;)

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"LOCAL Suspicious Executable (PE offset 160)"; flow:established,from_server; content:"MZ"; rawbytes; byte_test:4,=,160,58,relative,little; content:"PE|00 00|"; rawbytes; within:162; sid:60; rev:1;)

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"LOCAL Suspicious Executable (PE offset 512)"; flow:established,from_server; content:"MZ"; rawbytes; byte_test:4,=,512,58,relative,little; content:"PE|00 00|"; rawbytes; within:514; sid:61; rev:1;)

Couple of interesting and important notes. There was not a single legitimate binary which contained a PE offset under 128 bytes. The offsets in malware which did not match those of legitimate files occured in %25 of malicious samples.

All offsets found:

Suspicious PE offsets (malware of 467 samples):
12, 16, 64, 96, 124, 144, 152, 160, 512

Legitimate PE offsets (XP Sp2 8582 samples):
128, 168, 176, 184, 192, 200, 208, 216, 224, 232, 240, 248, 256, 264, 272, 280, 288, 296, 304, 312, 320, 336, 344, 392, 584, 592, 600, 608, 616, 624, 632, 1024, 7680